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Defining the Essence of Being Human
Efthimios Parasidis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For centuries, anthropologists have probed the planet to
unearth evidence that assists in answering the fundamental
question of what it means to be human. Embryologists and geneticists more recently joined the investigation and have meaningfully supplemented the rich history of anthropological research with detailed analysis based on contemporary medical
data. Despite a plethora of significant findings that have resulted from these endeavors, lawmakers, and legal scholars
have often neglected or misinterpreted scientific discoveries.
These shortcomings have proven detrimental, as evidenced by
regulatory deficiencies surrounding biomedical innovations and
recent legislative proposals that ostensibly rely on scientific
factors to define human life. The goal of this Article is to reframe the legal debate of defining what it means to be human
by bridging the gap between science and law.
Accurately defining who or what qualifies as human has
significant implications for a myriad of legal and regulatory
matters.1 These include identifying the constitutional protec-

© 2012 Efthimios Parasidis
* Efthimios Parasidis, Assistant Professor of Law, Center for Health
Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of Law. This article was solicited
by The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law for its 2011 conference on emerging issues in comparative law, and this is a substantially revised
version of a think piece that is included in a compilation of conference-related
essays. I thank Monica Eppinger, Chad Flanders, Jeff Redding and Magdalen
Sarrinikolaou for insightful comments on early drafts of this work, and Nathaniel Marschalk for exceptional research assistance. Special thanks to the
editors and the staff of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
for outstanding editorial assistance. Inspiration for this article came from my
daughter, Anais Anastasia Parasidis, who was born during the course of my
research.
1. For example, is there a point at which a genetically-engineered, physically-altered, or pharmacologically-enhanced person ceases to be a human?
Should a distinction be recognized between an in vitro and in vivo human embryo? Ought a synthetically-created living organism ever be deemed a human?
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tions that apply to human embryos and other developmental
stages of human life,2 delineating the scope of patent protection
for inventions that encompass a human organism,3 and characterizing the legal standing of human-animal chimeras and synthetically-created organisms.4 Articulating clear legal standards for defining what it means to be human also facilitates the
As Peter Singer explains, accurately defining life and death is not an “academic problem[] found in the abstract theories of philosophers who remain remote
from the real world,” but rather has “direct consequences for human beings at
the most deeply significant moments of their lives.” PETER SINGER,
RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH 3 (1994); see also ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE
LAW OF LIFE AND DEATH 5 (2011) (“The lack of attention to the law of life and
death is remarkable given law’s ubiquity and centrality to our lives.”).
2. An integral component of the abortion debate centers on defining
where human life begins and explaining whether an embryo or fetus should be
afforded the same protections as human beings. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note
1, at 5.
3. A provision of the America Invents Act of 2011—the most extensive
amendments to U.S. patent law since 1952—prohibits patent protection for
any “claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 32(a) (2011); see also Efthimios
Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323,
400–01 (2010) (outlining history of patent protection for claims that encompass a human organism). While current law provides little guidance in defining the phrase “encompassing a human organism,” a number of patents arguably would qualify. Id. For example, the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation—which manages intellectual property created by scientists at the
University of Wisconsin—“owns three patents that provide a property interest
over a method of isolating human embryonic stem cells as well as the resultant stem cell lines . . . .” Id. In addition, Johns Hopkins University owns a patent titled “Human Stem Cells.” Id.
4. In 2002, scientists created a microorganism entirely from synthetic
gene sequences. ED REGIS, WHAT IS LIFE?: INVESTIGATING THE NATURE OF
LIFE IN THE AGE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 130 (2008). During a two-week period
of the following year, scientists created a synthetic virus. Id. at 132. In 2004,
researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) set-up a
Standard Registry of Biological Parts. Id. at 133. According to this online registry, these “genetic parts . . . can be mixed and matched to build synthetic biology devices and systems.” REGISTRY STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS,
http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). The goal of the
program is “to make biology easier to engineer.” Id. Coupled with research in
synthetic biology, IBM has recently developed a computer chip that is programmed to mimic the human brain. Oliver Renick, IBM Chip ‘Senses’ Events
to React Like Brain, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 17, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2011-08-18/ibm-chip-senses-events-to-react-in-ways-that-mim
ic-human-brain.html. Called “cognitive computers,” the devices can “react to
taste, touch, smells, and sound.” Id. Another IBM creation, Watson, is a “question answering machine” that uses natural language processing to compete
with humans on the popular television show Jeopardy!. John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, it’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A1.
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enactment of regulatory frameworks that properly delineate
practical and ethically justifiable limitations of therapies and
therapeutics.5 The public debate galvanized by the 2011 ballot
initiative in Mississippi—where voters were asked to consider
amending the state constitution to define “person” as encompassing “every human being from the moment of fertilization,
cloning, or the equivalent thereof”—underscores important
public policy considerations and the need to accurately define
what precisely is encompassed by the term human.6
Although the proposed amendment was written to further
anti-abortion politics, had the measure passed, there would
5. This concern is not a recent phenomenon. For example, in 1976, Cambridge, Massachusetts banned scientists from conducting particular recombinant DNA experiments within city limits for three months. REGIS, supra note
4, at 128. Genetic engineering, which in its early stages, was seen as “unnatural” and a “threat to humanity.” Id. at 127–28. This directly affected two major
research institutions—Harvard University and MIT. SHANE CROTTY, AHEAD
OF THE CURVE: DAVID BALTIMORE’S LIFE IN SCIENCE 122 (2001). Within a decade, the attitude towards genetic engineering had changed drastically, and by
1982, the FDA approved the first genetically engineered biological substance
for human use. REGIS, supra note 4, at 128. More recently, the debate surrounding human enhancement provides an apt example. While a significant
number of biomedical advancements have been applied to improve the health
of patients and the general public, others have been utilized nontherapeutically to manipulate and enhance the structure and function of individuals. See, e.g., Timothy D. Holze et al., “Doctor, Would You Prescribe a Pill
to Help Me…?” A National Survey of Physicians on Using Medicine for Human
Enhancement, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 13, 2011, at 3, 3. Notably, the dividing
line between therapy and enhancement is, at best, ambiguous. See, e.g., Paul
Root Wolpe, Treatment, Enhancement, and the Ethics of Neurotherapeutics, 50
BRAIN & COGNITION 387, 388 (2002). Some bioethicists argue that all medical
treatment should be deemed enhancements because such treatment involves
altering the natural course of a human’s life. See, e.g., John Harris, Enhancements are a Moral Obligation, in HUMAN ENHANCEMENT (Julian Savulescu &
Nick Bostrom eds., 2009), at 131, 152–53. Others draw the line at whether a
biomedical product results in a characteristic that is beyond that typical of
human traits. See, e.g., Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, Defending Human Enhancement Technologies: Unveiling Normativity, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 483, 483–
84 (2010). For a provocative compilation of essays on the topic of human enhancements, see HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, supra note 5; see also ROBERT
SPARROW, A NOT-SO-NEW EUGENICS 32, 33 (2011) (discussing
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and embryo splitting); Holze et al., supra
note, at 4 (analyzing physicians’ reactions to patients seeking enhancement).
6. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Mississippi Attempts to Define the Start of
Personhood, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
nov/04/nation/la-na-mississippi-abortion-20111105; Karen McVeigh, Mississippi Votes Evenly Split over Controversial Abortion Ballot, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7,
2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/07/mississippiabortion-ballot-voters-split. In Colorado, a similar proposal was considered
and rejected in 2008 and 2010. Fausset, supra.
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have been fundamental uncertainty as to what qualifies as a
human being. By defining “person” as a “human being,” the
Mississippi proposal begged the very question it sought to answer. For example, the amendment did not provide any guidance as to whether the term “human being” includes humananimal chimeras and, if so, what percent of human genetic material is necessary to classify a human-animal chimera as human.7 The proposal also neglected to provide guidance as to
whether a human blastocyst with removed stem cells would
qualify as a human being, or what standing would be granted
to the isolated cells.
The failed initiative in Mississippi serves as a helpful paradigm to illustrate the far-reaching implications that result
from insufficiently defining what is encompassed by the term
human.8 The shortcomings of the Mississippi definition, however, are not unique. A few months prior to the Mississippi vote,
the Ohio House of Representatives approved the “heartbeat
bill,” which criminalizes abortion once a fetal heartbeat is detected on the theory that life begins (or is likely to begin) when

7. The transfer of genes from one species to another has been possible
since the 1980s, and transgenesis could be used to significantly enhance human beings. See Julian Savulescu, The Human Prejudice and the Moral Status
of Enhanced Beings: What Do We Owe the Gods?, in HUMAN ENHANCEMENT,
supra note 5, at 211–12 (discussing transgenic species and human-animal
chimeras). In contrast to the Mississippi proposal, the German Ethics Council
recently set forth limitations on research with human-animal chimeras. See
German Ethics Council Weighs in on Human-Animal Chimeras, 333 SCIENCE
1806, 1806–07 (2011). The Council approved of mice carrying human genes,
but not transgenic monkeys with human genes. Id. at 1806. The Council recommended that three things be forbidden: (1) the introduction of animal genes
into the human germline; (2) the development of human sperm or egg in an
animal; and (3) the implantation of an animal embryo into a human being. Id.
According to the Council, “[p]utting human brain cells into animals should receive special attention.” Id. “The council failed to reach consensus on the creation of so-called cybrids,” which result from inserting the nucleus of a human
cell into an animal oocyte. Id. This practice has been utilized to create embryonic stem cell lines. Id. at 1806–07.
8. As one example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused to characterize a human preembryo as a person, concluding that the “preembryos are
not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life.” Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). Despite this characterization, the court found that those who have created the embryo can own and
control it, thus deeming the human embryo, for all practical purposes, to be
property.
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the heart starts to function.9 The legislation does not discuss if
other human rights attach at this juncture of human development, whether a person whose heart temporarily stops beating
should be deemed dead under the law, or the extent to which
medical personnel must provide assistance to an individual
whose heart has stopped beating.10
Equally deficient is a 2010 Nebraska law that focuses not
on fertilization or cardiovascular functioning, but rather on the
ability to experience pain. Titled the “Pain-Capable Unborn
Child Protection Act,” this statute defines “human” simply as a
member of the species Homo sapiens and restricts a woman’s
ability to have an abortion once fetal pain is detected.11 The
goal of the measure is to limit abortion rights prior to the point
at which a developing fetus is deemed to be viable.12 By focus9. Bill Analysis, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th
Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), as passed by the House, at 9; see Associated Press,
‘Heartbeat’ Bill Suspended as Amendments Pile Up on Ohio Senate,
CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:36 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/ind
ex.ssf/2011/12/heartbeat_bill_suspended_as_am.html; Erik Eckholm, Fetal
Heartbeat Bill Splits Anti-Abortion Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, at A1.
Detection of a fetal heartbeat typically occurs six to eight weeks into a pregnancy. Concerns Regarding Early Fetal Development, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/earlyfetaldevelop
ment.htm (last updated Oct. 2008).
10. The account of one patient is telling:
Richard Selzer, the surgeon who took early retirement in order to
write more of his cogitations on Life, died a few years ago but, fortunately for us all, rose again shortly thereafter. His EKG was flat for
four and a half minutes, and no amount of resuscitation had any effect. The attending nurse wrote the time of death on the chart, and
ten minutes later noted the characteristic “settling” of the body, “the
fixity that is incontrovertible.” Then, unexpectedly, the body shuddered: “A moment later he draws his first breath. It is a deep sigh
that might be interpreted as one either of sorrow or of satisfaction, as
though one precious thing were being relinquished and another embraced.” Soon, a tracing returns to the electrocardiogram, and the
breathing becomes regular. “The room, which had descended into a
subaqueous silence emanating from the corpse, is now fiercely active.
All the machinery is back in place, chugging, vibrating, clicking, ringing.” Later, at the weekly conference, people question the judgment of
death, but the nurses persisted with their claim that the cardiogram
was flat, and that there was neither a pulse nor blood pressure.
Margaret Lock, Death in Technological Time: Locating the End of Meaningful
Life, 10 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 575, 575–76 (1996).
11. Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, Legis. Bill 1103, 101st
Leg., 2d Sess. § 5 (Neb. 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28, 38, 53), available at http://www.legislature.ne
.gov/FloorDocs/101/PDF/Slip/LB1103.pdf.
12. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 236 (2011).
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ing on fetal pain, however, the law fails to address how individuals who are incapable of feeling pain should be treated. For
example, some anencephalic infants may not feel pain even after they are born.13 Moreover, contrary to the “findings” of the
legislature, which assert that fetal pain can be detected at
twenty weeks,14 the best available evidence suggests that a fetus may begin to experience pain at around twenty-nine or thirty weeks.15
The Ohio, Mississippi, and Nebraska proposals reflect a
trend of political activism where conservative legislators have
sought to restrict abortion rights through legal definitions of
human that ostensibly reflect current medical knowledge.16
Upon close analysis, however, these measures are more accurately characterized as normative assertions masked as medical certainties through specious interpretations of scientific research. While normative claims serve to inform the
construction of legal frameworks,17 the failure to faithfully in13. Anencephaly, AM. ACAD. NEUROLOGY, http://patients.aan.com/disord
ers/index.cfm?event=view&disorder_id=846 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
14. Legis. B. 1103, §§ 3,4.
15. Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 12, at 238.
16. See, e.g., Tim Murphy, The Most Radical Anti-Abortion Measures in
America, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 27, 2011, 2:00AM), http://motherjones.com/
politics/2011/09/abortion-mississippi-les-riley. For example, the Mississippi
ballot proposal was drafted by Les Riley, a supporter of the group Christian
Exodus. Id.; McVeigh, supra note 6. Christian Exodus was founded “in response to the moral degeneration of the American culture,” and one of its primary goals is “to move thousands of Christian constitutionalists to South Carolina to accelerate the return to self-government based upon Christian
principles at the local and State level.” About Us, CHRISTIAN EXODUS,
http://christianexodus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9
&Itemid=37 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). Riley is also the Chairman of the Constitution Party of Mississippi, whose goal is to “restore American jurisprudence to its Biblical foundations.” Constitution Party Platform, CONST. PARTY,
http://www.constitutionparty.com/documents/2008CPPlatform .pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
17. One of the most salient features of interdisciplinary research is the
interplay between normative and descriptive modalities of knowledge.
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric
of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 632–33; see also Svein Eng,
Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions, 13 RATIO JURIS 236, 236−39
(2000) (discussing the fusion of normative and descriptive propositions in legal
and philosophical reasoning). As Riles explains, a defining aspect of this interplay “is that each slips effortlessly, almost uncontrollably, into the other . . .
spawn[ing] a parallel transformation in the knowledge” produced. Riles, supra, at 644, 647. Whereas Riles’s observations stem from an interdisciplinary
study of law and anthropology, id. at 650, her observations are particularly
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tegrate scientific factors into legal definitions of human has
frustrated judicious dialogue.18 With an eye towards reframing
the current debate and assisting policymakers in structuring
appropriate definitions and regulations, this Article explores
the essence of being human by synthesizing normative theories
with research findings from anthropology, comparative genomics, embryology, and medicine.
Although my discussion in this Article focuses on the
knowledge gained from exploring scientific findings related to
the question of personhood, I am mindful of the fact that this
approach may be characterized as reflecting a bias that emphasizes contemporary scientific knowledge over other epistemological lenses. For example, it is reasonable to assert that defining human is no less accurate if one adopts a religious or
spiritual perspective, or one that is based on socio-cultural observations. Similarly, some may argue that an emphasis on descriptive factors, where there may not be agreement on the validity or significance of the factors, may not ultimately provide
any meaningful guidance.
Indeed, the epistemology of what makes us human invariably reflects historical and cultural preconceptions.19 The fact
relevant to an analysis of legal definitions of human.
18. See, e.g., Oscar Schacter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 849 (1983). Apart from the difficulty in defining human
life, scholars and scientists have struggled to find a definition of “life.” See,
e.g., REGIS, supra note 4, at 156–58. As Carl Sagan noted in 1970, “despite the
enormous fund of information that [biologists] have provided, it is a remarkable fact that no general agreement exists on what it is that is being studied.
There is no generally accepted definition of life.” Id. at 156. More than three
decades after Sagan’s observation, Stephen Wolfram concluded that “every
single general definition that has been given both includes systems that are
not normally considered alive, and excludes ones that are.” Id. at 158 (citing
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002)).
19. See, e.g., DANIEL E. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN
HEAD 528 (2011) (“Perhaps the biggest challenge is to avoid the burden of preconceived biases and assumptions about what it is to be human . . . sometimes
explicit, but often implicit . . . .”). These assumptions include “how we test hypotheses about evolutionary relationships, and how we evaluate their functional and behavioral capabilities.” Id. Although it may be difficult to resolve
epistemological problems, information—including fossil, genetic, archaeological, and linguistic—allow inferences to be made and hypotheses to be tested.
Id. Disagreements regarding human origins often stem from various assumptions about the significance of available information to the questions we
pose—not from a lack of information. Id. Further, to what extent does limited
evidence in the archaeological record for “modern” behaviors indicate an absence of the capability to think abstractly? Id. For Lieberman, the “best strategy is to be epistemologically cautious about any phylogenetic and behavioral
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that lawmakers and theorists often define what it means to be
human through reference to medical criteria is informative in
its own right. Insofar as legal definitions of human have increasingly incorporated medical factors (as evidenced by the
aforementioned anti-abortion measures), the framing of the debate has shifted away from a theological or philosophical inquiry and towards a scientific examination. That this shift is
largely motivated by activists who typically support a religious
conception of human life is somewhat ironic.20
Nevertheless, to the extent that a legal definition of human
incorporates descriptive characteristics, there is a need to be
truthful in accurately analyzing the implications of the characteristics and the extent to which contemporary science supports
the underlying assertions.21 It is likewise important to separate
the question of personhood from the moral and legal obligations
that may be owed to each individual. Doing so facilitates a nuanced analysis of personhood that is free from biases and comhypotheses.” Id.
20. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 16. For example, anti-abortion advocates
who supported the aforementioned legal definitions of human have mischaracterized scientific data in an effort to promote their belief in “the God-given legal personhood of all unborn human beings.” See, e.g., CONST. PARTY, supra
note 16.
21. Editorial, A Look Within, 455 NATURE 1007, 1008 (2008) (indicating
that a “major challenge for researchers is being objective about a topic as philosophically, politically and ethically charged as human nature” and arguing
that increased dialogue between disciplines in essential). Coupled with the
lack of interdisciplinary collaboration, there is significant divergence as to how
individual nations address the legal parameters of what it means to be human. See Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon Kass, A Statutory Definition of
the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal,
121 U. PENN. L. REV. 87, 110 (1972); Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the
Proposition that “Life Begins at Conception,” 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600 (1991).
These differences manifest in various areas of law and public policy, including
regulations surrounding synthetic biology, stem-cell research, neurological enhancement and manipulation, abortion, and end-of-life issues. See generally
SINGER, supra note 1, at 3. Although nations have successfully limited treatment and research in these and other areas, in some instances, these limitations have stimulated an underground market and encouraged therapeutic
and non-therapeutic forum shopping. See John Goldenring, The Brain-Life
Theory: Toward a Consistent Biological Definition of Humanness, 11 J. MED.
ETHICS 198, 198 (1985). Importantly, the growing ease at which individuals
are able to cross national borders, and thus avail themselves of competing legal and public policy frameworks, complicates and jeopardizes the practical
reach of any individual legal standard. See Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulescu,
Introduction: Human Enhancement Ethics: The State of the Debate, in HUMAN
ENHANCEMENT, supra note 5, at 1, 12.
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plexities that flow from deontological theories.
With these reflections as a background,22 I divide the inquiry of this Article into two questions: (1) at the population
level, what distinguishes humans from other species; and (2)
how precisely do we define the life and death of an individual
human being? In discussing a population-level definition, I focus my analysis on an examination of anthropological findings
and comparative genomics. With respect to the second inquiry,
I advocate a definition of human that is linked to a populationbased perspective coupled with an “organism-as-a-whole” conception of life and death. Specifically, an individual human being is properly deemed to be alive so long as it is functioning as
an organism-as-a-whole, irrespective of the functionality of any
particular physiological trait. Thus, an individual’s life commences when the being begins to function as an organism-as-awhole and ends when the being stops functioning as an organism-as-a-whole.23

22. In writing this Article, I am mindful of a statement made by Nobel
Laureate Erwin Schrodinger in his classic 1944 book, What is Life?:
A scientist is supposed to have a complete and thorough knowledge,
at first hand, of some subjects and, therefore, is usually expected not
to write on any topic of which he is not a master. This is regarded as a
matter of noblesse oblige. For the present purpose I beg to renounce
the noblesse, if any, and to be freed of the ensuing obligation. My excuse is as follows:
We have inherited from our forefathers the keen longing for unified, all-embracing knowledge. The very name given to the highest institutions of learning reminds us, that from antiquity and throughout
many centuries the universal aspect has been the only one to be given
full credit. But the spread, both in width and depth, of the multifarious branches of knowledge during the last hundred odd years has confronted us with a queer dilemma. We feel clearly that we are only now
beginning to acquire reliable material for welding together the sumtotal of all that is known into a whole; but, on the other hand, it has
become next to impossible for a single mind fully to command more
than a small specialized portion of it.
I can see no other escape from this dilemma (lest our true aim be
lost forever) than that some of us should venture to embark on a synthesis of facts and theories, albeit with second-hand and incomplete
knowledge of some of them—and at the risk of making fools of ourselves.
ERWIN SCHRODINGER, WHAT IS LIFE?: THE PHYSICAL ASPECT OF THE LIVING
CELL vii (1945). In dispensing with the practice of noblesse oblige, I have endeavored to maintain a respectable understanding of the disciplines discussed
herein.
23. Throughout the Article, I use the words “human,” “human being,” and
“person” interchangeably.

012 PARASIDIS_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

834

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:25 PM

[Vol. 13:2

II. DISTINGUISHING HUMANS AS A UNIQUE SPECIES
Examining the physical, cognitive, and cultural evolution
of humans as a species provides relevant insights into a population-level definition of human. Nature does not provide us
with unambiguous boundaries between species. Rather, the
boundaries reflect our method of classifying living organisms.
Although a number of disciplines provide relevant insights into
factors that distinguish humans from other species, there remains significant disagreement on what characteristics are
uniquely human.24 Further, the lack of discussion between disciplines has resulted in duplicated efforts and foregone opportunities to exchange relevant insights.25 In this Part, I explore
a population-level definition of human by drawing upon findings from anthropology26 and comparative genomics.27
A. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL RECORD
Modern-day humans are classified as belonging to the species Homo sapiens, which is part of the genus Homo.28 Anthro24. Science does not provide us with an “agreed-upon yardstick for how
much morphologic or genetic difference separates species.” Ann Gibbons, The
Species Problem, 331 SCIENCE 394, 394 (2011) (“The question of how to define
a species has divided researchers for centuries.”). As Charles Darwin observed
more than a century ago, “[n]o one definition has satisfied all naturalists.” Id.
(citing CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES: BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION, OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE
FOR LIFE (1859)); see also PAUL RABINOW, ANTHROPOS TODAY: REFLECTIONS
ON MODERN EQUIPMENT 4 (2003) (“The fact that there is a problem in thinking about human things, and that part of that problem lies in the inability to
provide a stable solution, is coexistent and contemporal with the practice itself.”).
25. See Editorial, supra note 21, at 1008.
26. The field of anthropology is often characterized as containing four subfields: archaeology, biological anthropology, linguistics, and socio-cultural anthropology. What is Anthropology?, AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N,
http://www.aaanet.org/about/WhatisAnthropology.cfm (last visited Jan. 30,
2012). Each subfield provides considerable insight into the fundamental question of what distinguishes humans as a species. See id.
27. Comparative genomics is a field of biological research that compares
the genome sequences of different species. Comparative Genomics, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/11509542 (last updated Oct. 13,
2011). Identifying differences allows scientists to understand the structure of
the human gene and to develop mechanisms to fight human disease. Id.
28. Colin Renfrew, Introduction: Becoming Human: Changing Perspectives on the Emergence of Human Values, in BECOMING HUMAN: INNOVATION
IN PREHISTORIC MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL CULTURE 1, 1 (Colin Renfrew & Iain
Morley eds., 2009) [hereinafter BECOMING HUMAN].
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pological data suggests that Homo sapiens emerged in Africa
approximately 150,000–200,000 years ago, dispersed to Arabia
around 60,000 years ago, and reached Europe 20,000 years
thereafter.29 Homo sapiens evolved from earlier hominins,30 either Homo erectus31 or Homo ergaster, who were themselves
descendants of Australopithecus.32 Recent studies further suggest that Homo neanderthalensis—commonly referred to as
Neanderthal Man33—co-existed with Homo sapiens in Europe
and elsewhere for thousands of years.34 Although the extent to
which each group interbred or exchanged ideas is unknown, the
fact that interbreeding occurred raises interesting hypotheses
as to how one species viewed the other.35 As will be discussed,
interbreeding
between
Homo
sapiens
and
Homo
neanderthalensis has complicated our ability to classify mod29. Id.; Christopher Henshilwood, The Origins of Symbolism, Spirituality,
and Shamans: Exploring Middle Stone Age Material Culture in South Africa,
in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 29, 30–31.
30. A hominin is a term describing an organism that is more closely related to a human than to a chimpanzee. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 3 n.1.
Hominid, the old term, was used in taxonomic nomenclature and differentiated humans (in the family Hominidae) from chimps and gorillas (in the family
Pongidae). Id. Chimps and humans are closely related to each other and, because of this, those species more closely related to humans than to chimps are
classified into the family Hominini, which means the correct term is hominin.
Id.
31. Notably, fossil evidence suggests that the bones that we currently include as Homo erectus may actually belong to two species, Homo erectus and
Homo heidelbergensis. Id. at 484–85. Furthermore, while most paleoanthropologists favor an African origin for Homo erectus, some argue that the species
originated in Asia. See, e.g., Bruce Bower, Homo May Have Originated in Asia,
SCI. NEWS, July 2, 2011, at 8.
32. See Colin Renfrew, Situating the Creative Explosion: Universal or Local?, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 74, 76
33. In 1863, William King—an Irish anatomist—suggested to call the species Homo neanderthalensis after the type species from the Neander valley.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 541 n.3. The German word for valley at that
time was “Thal.” Id. In 1901, the “h” in the word was eliminated because of
German spelling reform. Id. This resulted in differing opinions concerning
whether the English name for the species should be “Neanderthal” or
“Neandertal.” Id.
34. See Ludovic Slimak, Late Mousterian Persistence Near the Arctic Circle, 332 SCIENCE 841, 844 (2011).
35. See David Lewis-Williams, Of People and Pictures: The Nexus of Upper
Palaeolithic Religion, Social Discrimination, and Art, in BECOMING HUMAN
supra note 28, at 135, 139; Jane M. Renfrew, Neanderthal Symbolic Behaviour?, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 50, 59; Paul S.C. Taçon, Identifying Ancient Religious Thought and Iconography: Problems of Definition,
Preservation, and Interpretation, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 61,
70.
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ern-day humans as, genetically speaking, strictly Homo sapiens.
The paleoanthropological record reveals that many traits
that historically have been associated with modern humans
are, in fact, shared by earlier hominins and other animals.36
For example, Homo erectus exhibited behaviors such as tool
manufacture and the use of fire,37 while Homo
neanderthalensis fed and looked after severely handicapped
members of their communities.38 Findings further indicate that
Homo erectus deliberately buried their dead39 and that Homo
neanderthalensis treated their dead in a “varied, complex, and
multidimensional” manner.40 These traits are significant for
many reasons. They indicate activity beyond physical necessity,
a heightened sense of respect for both the living and dead, and
patterned group behavior which may be referred to as culture.
They also indicate a means to communicate, and provide us
with hints that some communicating may have concerned the
symbolic or semiotic.
In addition to the similarities within the genus Homo, a
variety of traits—such as the development and use of communicative practices and tools, the ability to teach and learn, and
the establishment of intricate social groups—are found
throughout the animal kingdom.41 Moreover, an early human
36. See Paleoanthropology: Hominid Family History, COGWEB,
http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/Paleoanthropology.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2007)
(“Here we see the first signs of hominins (human ancestors from the tribe
Hominini) whose bodies, jaws and teeth begin to resemble those of modern
humans, the type broadly labeled Homo erectus.”).
37. Renfrew, supra note 28, at 3.
38. Renfrew, supra note 35, at 51.
39. Renfrew, supra note 28, at 3.
40. Renfrew, supra note 35, at 54.
41. See A.I. DAGG, THE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF OLDER ANIMALS 28 (2009);
Stanley Ambrose, Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution, 291 SCIENCE
1748, 1748 (2001). Researchers have reported that chimpanzees, monkeys,
seals, and birds have been observed using tools, while gorillas also have been
observed to bury their dead. SINGER, supra note 1, at 175. Chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans have learned to use American Sign Language can recognize spoken words. Id. See also Bruce Bower, Chimpanzee has an Ear for Talk,
SCI. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2011, at 16. Dolphins can recognize their own image,
learn foreign languages, comprehend human pointing, use tools, and maintain
cultural traditions, while captive dolphins have been observed to commit suicide. See David Grimm, Are Dolphins Too Smart for Captivity, 332 SCIENCE
526, 526–27 (2011). Bonobo children have been diagnosed with autism and act
in ways that resemble autism in human children. See Nina Bai, Autism in An-
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embryo is morphologically similar to embryos of other animals,
including dogs, cows, mice, reptiles, amphibians, and fish.42 At
one point in its development, the human embryo possesses four
gill-like slits, which is the same number of slits found in fish,
salamanders, tortoises, chickens, pigs, and other species.43
Coupled with research into various species-specific traits,44
researchers often focus on cognitive and anatomical differences
between members of the genus Homo. For instance, the brain of
Homo sapiens includes a developed frontal lobe, which is an area that is intimately involved in functions essential to symbolic
thought.45 Symbolic thought, which may be defined as the representation of reality through language, imagery, or abstract
concepts, has long been viewed as a trait that is uniquely human.46 In addition to Homo sapiens, however, recent findings
suggest that Homo neanderthalensis also demonstrated abstract thought and symbolic behavior, and that Homo
neanderthalensis, Homo erectus, and Homo ergaster each “questioned their position in the universe.”47
A study of head anatomy provides an additional comparison point. Variation in head anatomy between hominins and
great apes is subtle,48 and the majority of differences between
Homo erectus and Homo sapiens appear to involve only “minor
tinkering.”49 Notably, Homo sapiens from 150,000 to 10,000
years ago are more similar to other like-aged Homo skulls than
they are to those of current populations.50 Research further
suggests that many features that differentiate today’s humans
in various parts of the world are the result of recent phenomeother Ape, SCI. AM. MIND, Sept. 2011, at 11.
42. See REGIS, supra note 4, at 111.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Christopher S. Henshilwood & Curtis W. Marean, The Origin
of Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 627, 627-28 (2003)
(outlining use of behavioral traits to identify and distinguish modern humans).
45. Henry de Lumley, The Emergence of Symbolic Thought: The Principal
Steps of Hominisation Leading Towards Greater Complexity, in BECOMING
HUMAN, supra note 28, at 10, 10.
46. See id. at 24. New evidence suggests that Homo sapiens practiced abstract thought and had lunar literacy between 164,000 and 120,000 years ago.
See Bruce Bower, Water’s Edge Ancestors, SCI. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2011, at 23.
47. Taçon, supra note 35.
48. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 58. While the heads have the same
basic plan with the same components, arranged in essentially the same way,
there are discernable and significant morphological differences. Id.
49. Id. at 527.
50. Id. at 529.

012 PARASIDIS_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

838

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:25 PM

[Vol. 13:2

na that may simply reflect random and unselected evolutionary
changes.51
Some evidence suggests that the ability of Homo sapiens to
interpret their own mental state began to appear approximately 75,000 years ago.52 Insofar as the ability to think introspectively is commonly believed to be a defining characteristic of
humans, the timing of the development is significant. Specifically, it appears that early Homo sapiens did not have the cognitive capacity for this type of mental activity or that they did
not utilize their cognitive capacity in this way.53
On the other hand, the earliest evidence of jewelry and
bodily adornments dates back approximately 164,000 years.54
However, Homo neanderthalensis also produced bodily adornments, such as “grooved and perforated animal teeth.”55 These
aspects are significant, as the notion of beautifying one’s body
through material objects is often cited as uniquely human. For
this and other reasons, some anthropologists argue that Homo
neanderthalensis appears to share the capacity and manifestation of traits that are often characterized as modern human behavior.56 Given these and other similarities, including genomic
comparisons, some paleoanthropologists have argued for inclusion of Homo neanderthalensis under the species Homo sapiens,
defined as a subspecies Homo sapiens neanderthalensis.57
Evidence suggests that the development of a distinct vocal

51. Id. at 527–29.
52. See Christopher S. Henshilwood et al., Engrave Ochres From the Middle Stone Age Levels at Blombos Cave, South Africa, 57 J. HUM. EVOLUTION
27, 28 (2009).
53. See Henshilwood & Marean, supra note 44, at 635 (“The key criterion
for modern human behavior is not the capacity for symbolic thought but the
use of symbolism to organize behavior.”).
54. See Bruce Bower, Tool Finishing Technique Arose Before Humans
First Left Africa, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 20, 2010, at 6; see also Renfrew, supra note
32, at 77.
55. Trenton W. Holliday, Comment on Henshilwood & Marean: The
Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 639, 640
(2003).
56. See id.
57. Bruce Bower, Defining Neandertals, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at 31.
This debate has existed for over a century. Id. In the mid-twentieth century,
scientists drastically altered their view of Homo neanderthalensis, and proposed that a well-dressed Neanderthal would go unnoticed in the subway.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 544. A study of head anatomy prompted this
change. Id.
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cord, which is present in modern-day humans and allows for
the development of language, occurred approximately 100,000
years ago, while the vocal ability found in modern-day humans
has been present for less than 50,000 years ago.58 For many anthropologists, language (which includes grammar and syntax)
is a uniquely human phenomenon and, thus, may be properly
characterized as the defining characteristic of humans.59 On the
other hand, research has challenged a linguistic-centered definition of human and has revealed that other animals, such as
birds and non-human mammals, maintain language-specific
traits that were once characterized as uniquely human.60 In
any event, the capacity for language must be distinguished
from the manifestation of language in material culture.61
Up through the 1990s, there was widespread agreement
that modern human behavior appeared between 50,000 and
40,000 years ago.62 This position was challenged by theorists
who argued that behavioral and technological differences between humans were, at least in part, the result of environmental differences.63 Insofar as hunter-gatherer technological complexity decreases from arctic to tropical environments, this
could be the result of need (hunter-gatherers in cold environments must invest more time and effort to hunt and store food),
rather than any difference in ability or species-specific characteristics.64
Indeed, until about 10,000 years ago, most Homo sapiens
lived as hunter-gatherers.65 Accordingly, the advancements

58. See Leanord E. Newton, What Makes Us Human?, 27 BIOSCI. REP.
185, 186 (2007).
59. See, e.g., Jacques Mehler et al., Why is Language Unique to Humans?,
in PERCEPT, DECISION, ACTION: BRIDGING THE GAPS 251, 254–55, 276–77
(2005). For a comprehensive account of linguistic anthropology, see TERRENCE
W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND
THE BRAIN (1998).
60. See, e.g., W. Tecumseh Fitch & David Reby, The Descended Larynx is
Not Uniquely Human, 268 PROC. R. SOC. LONDON 1669, 1669 (2001); Timothy
Q. Gentner et al., Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning by Songbirds, 440
NATURE 1204, 1204 (2006).
61. See Henshilwood & Marean, supra note 44, at 635 (“The capacity for
language probably existed in humans well before it was manifested in material culture.”).
62. See id. at 629.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 632.
65. See, e.g., Kim R. Hill et al., Co-Residence Patterns in Hunter-Gatherer
Societies Show Unique Human Social Structure, 331 SCIENCE 1286, 1286
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that contemporary humans are heralded for—which include the
development of diverse disciplines in the arts and sciences, the
quest for exchange of information and ideas, the ability to manipulate and alter their environment, and the creation of global
systems of social networks and regulations—are recent accomplishments that are not found throughout the existence of Homo sapiens.66 As anthropologists highlight, however, human
behavior and human culture is cumulative, and thus the passage of time “is in itself a powerful explanator (through the
buildup of social knowledge and population numbers) of differences between human societies separated by tens of thousands
of years.”67
Just as farming and computers were not invented by humans who suddenly evolved novel cognitive capabilities, one
cannot infer that the invention of tools or adornments, or the
practice of abstract thinking, occurred because of an evolutionary shift in brain structure or function.68 Insofar as there are
over twenty definitions for that which is encompassed by the
species Homo sapiens, use of this term provides little guidance
in defining what it means to be human.69
In reviewing the anthropological record, we must be mindful not to read our own ways of thinking into the enigmatic records of the past.70 There is significant debate as to how research findings ought be analyzed, thus the findings
summarized herein should not be taken as the definitive position of the discipline as a whole.71 Rather, the aforementioned
(2011) (indicating that “humans lived as foragers for [ninety-five percent] of
our species’ history”).
66. See J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Human Origins and Religious Awareness, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28,
at 235, 237 (discussing the emergence of early religion); Keith Ward, Innovation in Material and Spiritual Culture: Exploring Conjectured Relationships,
in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 253, 256.
67. See Joao Zilhao, Comment on Henshilwood & Marean, The Origin of
Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 642, 643 (2003).
68. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 584.
69. See Savulescu, supra note 7, at 242.
70. See Taçon, supra note 35, at 61.
71. See Savulescu, supra note 7, at 242 (indicating that there are over
twenty definitions of the species Homo sapiens); Christopher S. Henshilwood
& Curtis W. Marean, Reply to Comments on Henshilwood & Marean, The
Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 643, 646
(2003) (“There is no single paradigm, and there may never be one, for defining
exactly when, where, and how humans became behaviorally modern.”).
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findings are intended to highlight the difficulty that researchers face in arriving at a precise population-level definition of
human. Though the work of humans has provided humans with
an intricate understanding of our place in the universe, much
additional work is needed to unearth new information and analyze relevant findings in an effort to gain an improved understanding of this age-old question.
B. COMPARATIVE GENOMICS
As with every organism, humans have a unique genome
that is shaped by our evolutionary history. Although the Human Genome Project was “completed” over a decade ago, no one
really knows exactly how many genes make up the human genome or the genetic components necessary to make a human.72
For example, research suggests that each person not only has a
unique genetic blueprint, but that each person has a different
number of genes.73 Furthermore, significant portions of a genome can be missing from, or added to, a person’s genome,
sometimes with no apparent ill effects.74
Genetic research supports some of the anthropological
studies highlighted in the previous subpart.75 The mapping of
72. See Tina Hesman Saey, Scientists Still Making Entries in Human Genetic Encyclopedia, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 6, 2010, at 5 [hereinafter Saey, Scientists
Still Making Entries in Human Genetic Encyclopedia]. For instance, the
RefSeq database, which is maintained by the U.S. National Institutes of
Health, estimates that humans have 22,333 genes that encode proteins. Id. On
the other hand, the Gencode database, maintained by the Wellcome Trust
Sanger Institute in England, currently sets the number at 21,671. Id. These
figures vary drastically from earlier estimates. For instance, between 1990
and 1996, estimates placed the human gene count between 80,000 to 100,000
genes. Id. at 6. Between 2000 and 2001, the number dropped to 30,000 to
40,000. Id. Furthermore, the number of genes in a species’ genome does not
necessarily correlate with the complexity of the species. For example, grapes
are estimated to have 30,434 genes, chickens 16,736 genes, and fruit flies
14,889 genes. Id.; see also Tina Hesman Saey, Missing Lincs: Lesser-Known
Genetic Material Helps Explain Why Humans are Human, SCI. NEWS, Dec. 17,
2011, at 22–23 (detailing the role of lincRNAs, which were once thought by
many scientists to be “worthless”); Tom Siegfried, Turns Out that ‘Junk DNA’
Wasn’t Just Talking Trash, SCI. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2011, at 2 (indicating that
non-coding DNA sequences, though once characterized by many scientists as
“junk” DNA, contain codes for making non-protein molecules).
73. Saey, Scientists Still Making Entries in Human Genetic Encyclopedia,
supra note 72, at 6.
74. Id.
75. See Renfrew, supra note 32, at 76 (“The impact of DNA studies . . .
now documents in a much more detailed way the out-of-Africa expansion of
our species around sixty thousand years ago.”).
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the chimpanzee genome has also provided an important reference point for comparative genomic analysis. Interestingly,
once the extent of the similarity between the human and chimpanzee genomes was published, some scholars advocated for
the merger of the genus Pan (of which the chimpanzee and
bonobo are species) with the genus Homo.76
In fact, Swedish biologist Carl Linnaeus, who devised our
modern-day system of classifying plants and animals into kingdom, phylum, order, family, genus, and species, originally
found that he had developed a set of criteria that put human
beings in the same genus as chimpanzees.77 Since this went
against the religious notion that humans were created as a
separate entity—an idea staunchly upheld by the Swedish Lutheran Church, as well as many other religions—Lineaus altered the application of his own criteria and placed humans
alone in the genus Homo.78 Some years later, in 1788, perhaps
not proud of what he had done, he remarked:
I demand of you, and of the whole world, that you show me a generic
character . . . by which to distinguish between Man and Ape. I myself
most assuredly know of none. I wish somebody would indicate one to
me. But, if I had called man an ape, or vice versa, I would have fallen
under the ban of all the ecclesiastics. It may be that as a naturalist I
ought to have done so.79

Charles Darwin shared Linneaus’s scientific view that humans and chimpanzees were closely related. In The Descent of
Man, published in 1871, Darwin argues that the differences between humans and some non-human animals are “differences
of degree, not of kind.”80 Indeed, from a genetic perspective,
humans are more closely related to chimpanzees than gorillas

76. See Newton, supra note 58, at 185; see also SINGER, supra note 5, at
177–178. Despite the close genetic match, divergence between humans and
chimps occurred between five and ten million years ago. LIEBERMAN, supra
note 19, at 5.
77. SINGER, supra note 5, at 170.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing ANN DRUYAN & CARL SAGAN, SHADOWS OF FORGTTEN
ANCESTORS 274 (1992) (citing GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS
(1985))). This view was shared by one of Linnaes’s contempories, Lord
Monboddo, a Scottish anthropologist who described the similarities between
humans, chimpanzees, and oranutangs, and concluded that “it appears certain” that the three are of the same species. Id. (citing LORD J. B. MONBODDO,
OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE (1774)).
80. Id. at 171.
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are to chimpanzees.81 Similarly, “all of the African apes—
chimpanzees, gorillas, and humans—are more closely related to
each other than any of the three is related to orang-utans.”82
Although comparative genomics reveals that humans and
chimpanzees share approximately 98.4% of their genes,83 and
that Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens are approximately 99.5% equivalent, these figures provide little guidance
as to the functional significance of the genetic distinctions between the species.84 Notably, the order of magnitude of the divergence between humans and chimpanzees is less than that
between mice and rats.85 As most would agree, however, what
separates us from chimpanzees is far more profound than what
separates the two rodents. In this respect, the question becomes the extent to which comparative genomics can supply
helpful information in deciphering what genetic factors are
uniquely human.86
Recent findings reveal that modern-day humans in Europe
and Asia have inherited between one and four percent of their

81. Id. at 177.
82. Id. Recent legislation aims to phase-out research on great apes, which
would encompass chimpanzees. Great Ape Protection and Cost Savings Act of
2011, H.R. 1513, 112th Cong. (2011); see Roscoe G. Bartlett, Stop Using
Chimps as Guinea Pigs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A23. As the sponsor of
the bill explains, “chimpanzees experience pain, stress and social isolation in
ways strikingly similar to the way humans do.” Id. The United States and Gabon are the only two countries that conduct invasive research on chimpanzees.
See James Gorman, Chimps’ Days in Labs May Be Dwindling, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2011, at D4. An international movement—The Great Ape Project—
aims to protect the rights of non-human primates. See GREAT APE PROJECT,
http://www.greatapeproject.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2012); see also Adam
Kolber, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and
Others Apes, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 163, 164 (2001).
83. SINGER, supra note 1, at 177. The degree of difference between humans and chimpanzees is less than that between the red-eyed and white-eyed
vireos, which are two closely-related North American bird species. Id. Nevertheless, humans and chimps differ by approximately thirty-five million base
pairs. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 7.
84. See, e.g., Pennisi, Ancient DNA: No Sex Please, We’re Neandertals, 316
SCIENCE 967, 967 (2007) (discussing the difficulties in using genetic sequencing to determine whether species interbreeding ever occurred).
85. Geoff Spencer, New Genome Comparison Finds Chimps, Humans Very
Similar at the DNA Level, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/15515096 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
86. See generally T.S. Mikkelsen, What Makes us Human?, 5 GENOME
BIOLOGY 238 (2004) (discussing a comparative genomics study involving
chimpanzees).
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genes from Homo neanderthalensis.87 These genetic similarities
are not found in modern-day Africans, suggesting that Homo
neanderthalensis interbred with Homo sapiens in select regions
of the world.88 Genetic analysis of 40,000-year old bones found
in a Siberian cave suggest the existence of a third species—
neither Homo neanderthalensis nor Homo sapiens—that split
from the line that led to modern-day humans over one million
years ago.89 Called Denisovans (after the Denisova Cave in
which the bones were found), their genome share four to six
percent of genes with the modern-day Melanesian population of
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville Island.90 Remains of Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens were found along with
the Denisovan bones found in the Denisova Cave.91 Taken together, these findings suggest that the lineage of modern-day
humans is much more intertwined than originally believed.92
Despite the limited information currently available, and to
the extent that the evolution of a species has a genetic footprint, comparative genomics provides an important framework
for identifying relevant genetic differences between species. It
is equally as important to arrive at an understanding of how
the genetic basis (genotype) relates to observable characteristics (phenotype).93 Given the immense complexity of an organ-

87. Reading the Neandertal Genome, 330 SCIENCE 1605, 1605 (2010).
88. Id. But see Pennisi, supra note 84, at 967 (addressing the difficulties
with proving that such interbreeding actually occurred).
89. Ann Gibbons, Tiny Time Machines Revisit Ancient Life, 330 SCIENCE
1616, 1616 (2010); Laura Sanders, Genes Reveal Mysterious Group of Hominids as Neandertal Relatives, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at 10.
90. Sanders, supra note 89, at 10.
91. Id.
92. Id.; Ann Gibbons, Aboriginal Genome Shows Two-Wave Settlement of
Asia, 333 SCI. 1689, 1689 (2011); A New Ancestor for Homo?, 332 SCIENCE 534,
534 (2011); Ann Gibbons, A New View of the Birth of Homo Sapiens, 331
SCIENCE 392, 393 (2011).
93. “Until we better understand the relationship between genotype and
phenotype, we can adopt several strategies to mitigate the effects of ignorance.” LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 529. These include: “avoid picking unjustifiable null hypotheses”—for instance, “[t]here is no logical reason to assume a priori that an important trait such as language is either unique to
modern humans or shared by all large brained hominins unless proven otherwise”; second, “evaluate whether skeletal features contain phylogenetic or
functional information before assuming they do (or don’t)”—”[f]or a given feature, this means knowing something about its developmental bases, how it covaries with other features, and how it affects performance”; “and [t]hird, . . . be
careful about variation.” Id. “[M]ore than 85% of our species’ genetic variation
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ism’s phenotype, however, evolutionary changes are quite difficult to detect at this level.
The role of epigenetic factors further complicates the calculus. Epigenetic mechanisms are heritable changes in gene expression that are not coded in the DNA sequence itself.94 Internal and external environmental factors impact epigenetic
mechanisms, which, in turn, gradually alter gene expression.95
In other words, non-genetic factors cause the genes to behave
differently, and this expression may be passed down to future
generations. Examining the relationship between genetic and
epigenetic factors has led to new concepts on disease and the
heritability of traits, further complicating the process of unraveling the genomic evolution of humans.96
Comparative genomics provides great promise for bringing
to light genetic factors that are uniquely human.97 Given the
complexity of phenotypic plasticity and the role of epigenetic
factors, however, significant research must be conducted to better understand the significance of genetic variation. Current efforts to unravel this information are often borrowed from genetic information derived from studies of human disease,
mutational analysis of model organisms, and gene expression
profiles. Since these methods rely on indirect inference, rather
than experimental validation, they do not address the functional consequences of specific evolutionary changes.98 Furthermore, intellectual property protection has hindered the use of
much of this information and has stunted the development of
the field.99
III. IDENTIFYING THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN
Although an examination into defining what it means to be
human is often linked to one’s religious views—and it is imexists with any given population.” Id. Further, about 90% of the craniometric
variation is present within any given population. Id.
94. Andrew P. Feinberg, Phenotypic Plasticity and the Epigenetics of Human Disease, 447 NATURE 433, 433 (2007).
95. Id.
96. See Gerda Egger et al., Epigenetics in Human Disease and Prospects
for Epigenetic Therapy, 429 NATURE 457, 457 (2004).
97. Nitzan Mekel-Bobrov & Bruce T. Lahn, What Makes us Human: Revisiting an Age-old Question in the Genomic Era, 1 J. BIOMED. DISCOVERY &
COLLABORATION 18, 24 (2006).
98. Id. at 24.
99. See Parasidis, supra note 3, at 328.
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portant to be mindful of varying religious perspectives—this
Article will not explore or critique religious notions in great detail.100 Apart from religious perspectives, a number of scholars
have classified humans as living beings possessing bodily continuity, cognitive continuity, or genetic continuity.101 Despite
the intuitive appeal of these perspectives, each fails to sufficiently account for the continuity of all humans. For example,
throughout the course of a lifetime, a person may lose his or her
arms or legs or may have a transplanted heart, liver, eye, or
face. Identifying a person’s life as a continuous body fails to account for these factors. Similarly, the fact that each person begins as an unthinking embryo, may enjoy a productive life, and
then may end up as an unthinking person with severe cognitive
impairment demonstrates that no sort of mental continuity is
necessary.102 Furthermore, through germline gene therapy, the
genetic makeup of an individual may be altered, thus breaking
any sort of life-long genetic continuity.103 Additionally, one’s
genes may be altered by environmental factors such as radiation, chemicals, or viruses.104
To the extent that each of these theories fails to account for
the continuity of an individual over time, a more accurate barometer is preferred. I support a notion of continuity, proposed
by various scholars, that is linked to a biological basis for iden-

100. One traditional view, proposed by theologians and described by Rene
Descartes, claims that the continuation of an immaterial soul is what accounts
for human identity. See John P. Lizza, Introduction, in DEFINING THE
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE 1, 2 (John P. Lizza ed., 2009). Often referred to
as a dualist perspective, dualists claim that “a person could acquire a completely new body or continue to exist with no body at all.” Id. Building on the
notion that human identity is linked to a soul, St. Thomas Aquinas sets forth
an alternative view and classifies humans as “biological organism[s] informed
by a rational soul”. Id. Under this perspective, “[p]ersonal identity” lies in the
“continuation of an ensouled body.” Id. The soul and body “are inextricably
linked,” and the soul is what unifies and individuates a human. Id.
101. See Derek Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, in DEFINING THE
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE supra note 100, at 117, 118–25 (describing various continuity theories proposed over time).
102. See Eric T. Olson, An Argument for Animalism, in DEFINING THE
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 80, 86.
103. See Gene Therapy, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/therapy?show=all (“Gene therapy is an experimental technique that uses genes to treat or prevent disease.”).
104. See generally Feinberg, supra note 94, at 433 (discussing how cells
may be altered “in response to internal or external environmental cues”).
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tifying a person as an “organism-as-a-whole.”105 This is a holistic approach that reflects the coherent unity of an organism,
and views each person as a complex and integrated organism
whose existence is dependent on the emergent functioning of
many physiological components.106
The organism-as-a-whole is not necessarily the whole organism—one may continue to exist as an organism-as-a-whole
without continuity as a whole organism.107 For example, during
the course of one’s lifetime, physical, cognitive, or genetic traits
may come and go, and continuity of existence may remain intact, so long as there exists an identifiable organism-as-a-whole
throughout the course of each change. Within this framework,
this Article will focus on delineating the beginning and end of
an individual human life. Elucidating clear boundaries for life
and death permits a more informed discussion of legal, ethical,
and regulatory issues related to medical treatments.
A. INTERPRETING EMBRYOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
From at least the time of the ancient Greeks, scholars have
debated the proper moment at which human life comes into existence.108 This subpart of the Article will critically examine a
number of these perspectives, which range from the moment of
conception to birth. Many claim that human life begins at conception, which occurs when a human egg becomes fertilized
with human sperm and becomes a zygote.109 Conception,110
however, does not occur in an instant, but rather is a process
that lasts approximately twenty-four hours.111 This process
culminates in syngamy, which is where the genetic material of
105. See James L. Bernat, The Biophilosophical Basis of Whole-Brain
Death, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 413,
420.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 420; see, e.g., JAMES L. BERNAT, CHARLES M. CULVER &
BERNARD GERT, DEFINING DEATH IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (Hastings Ctr.
1982).
108. See generally William A. Wallace, St. Thomas on the Beginning and
Ending of Human Life, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra
note 100, at 469, 470 (indicating that Aristotle contemplated the point at
which human life begins).
109. See, e.g., PATRICK LEE, ABORTION & UNBORN HUMAN LIFE 71–107 (2d
ed., 2010) (“[F]ertilization generates a new human organism, for it produces a
distinct organism with the active disposition, or ability. . . to develop itself in
accord with its own genetic and epi-genetic information.”).
110. I use the terms “conception” and “fertilization” interchangeably.
111. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 94−95.
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the sperm and egg merge.112
Proponents of a conception-based definition must be specific as to when, precisely, a human life begins. Is it when the
sperm begins to fuse with the egg, when the fertilization process is complete, or somewhere in between? For those who
claim that human life begins once an egg is fertilized—a position that many religious scholars adhere to113—to be consistent,
they must adopt the position that the completion of the fertilization process marks the beginning of a human life. If so, then
contraceptives such as the morning-after pill do not destroy a
human life, so long as the pill is taken prior to the completion
of the fertilization process.
Complicating this analysis is the phenomenon of parthenogenesis, where an embryo is produced without sperm.114 While
parthenogenesis occurs naturally in various species, scientists
have used parthenogenesis to create human embryos.115 Using
fertilization as the moment when human life begins leads to
the absurd conclusion that some human embryos (i.e., those
produced through fertilization) are alive while others human
embryos (i.e., those produced through parthenogenesis) are not
because
there
is
no
fertilization
process
for
parthenogenetically-produced human embryos.
Following fertilization, the zygote begins to divide, with
each division occurring approximately every twenty-four
hours.116 Up to the eight-cell stage, each single cell may properly be viewed as an individual entity in the sense that there is
no fusion between the cells.117 Rather, the zygote is a loose collection of distinct cells held together by the zona pellucida,
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., An Absolute Value in History, in THE
MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (John T.
Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
114. H. M. Fangerau, Can Artificial Parthenogenesis Sidestep Ethical Pitfalls in Human Therapeutic Cloning? An Historical Perspective, 31 J. MED.
ETHICS 733, 733 (2004).
115. See generally id. (explaining that while embryos can be obtained from
unfertilized eggs, they will not grow into viable humans because the two necessary gene sets are missing).
116. Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Individuals, Humans and Persons: The
Issue of Moral Status, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra
note 100, at 294, 343; Human Early Embryo Development, SABIOSCIENCES,
http://www.sabiosciences.com/pathway.php?sn=Human_Early_Embryo_Develo
pment (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
117. Kuhse & Singer, supra note 116, at 342.
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which is the outer membrane of the egg.118 Each of these early
cells is totipotent, which means that each has the potential to
produce an entirely new organism.119 Around day fourteen after
fertilization, the primitive streak develops, resulting in a loss of
totipotency.120
Prior to the primitive streak, identical twins can develop
from a single zygote.121 Of course, twins may also form when
two eggs are fertilized and two zygotes produced.122 In some instances, the zygotes combine, forming a chimera, and continue
to develop as a single organism.123 Under these circumstances,
continuity as a distinct individual may be traced to some period
after fertilization and prior to, or at, the primitive streak stage.
Since the zygote’s development does not immediately differentiate the cells that form the embryo from those that form
the placenta and other tissues, a zygote, in and of itself, is arguably too indeterminate to constitute a real and ongoing human individual. For these reasons, a number of bioethicists
maintain that a human life cannot be said to exist prior to the
primitive streak stage.124
A recent decision by the German Supreme Court highlights
further practical concerns of defining human life prior to the
primitive streak stage.125 The German high court recently acquitted a doctor who performed pre-implantation genetic
screening in his clinic.126 Notably, the doctor reported himself
to authorities in an effort to seek clarification of German law.127

118. Id.
119. Id. Totipotency also refers to the ability of a cell to differentiate into
various cell types.
120. Id. at 324.
121. See, e.g., id. at 341.
122. See, e.g., id.
123. Id.
124. See Germain Grisez, When Do People Begin?, in DEFINING THE
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 294, 303. Similarly, some
Catholic priests have been troubled by the fact that twinning can occur after
conception. SINGER, supra note 5, at 94. This position was set forth by Father
Norman Ford, Master of Melbourne’s Catholic Theological College. Father
Ford concluded that, so long as twinning is a possibility, the cluster of cells
does not constitute an individual organism. Id. His position has been neither
accepted, nor condemned, by the Catholic Church. Id.
125. Federal Supreme Court Allows Preimplantation Diagnosis,
BIOTECHNOLOGIE (July 14, 2010), http://www.biotechnologie.de/BIO/Navig
ation/EN/root,did=113700.html.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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The German court limited use of the screening for detection of
serious diseases, and specifically indicated that the method
could not be utilized to select for eye color, hair color, or gender,
noting that the law does not permit “designer babies.”128
Although in utero genetic screening and pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis often require the removal of one or more totipotent cells, the court did not discuss whether the practice
kills a potential human being or whether the removed cells
equate to human life. These screening methods are commonly
used in a number of nations for disease-based testing, including
the United States, United Kingdom, and a majority of EU nations, while a number of other nations have no policy that directly prohibits use for non-disease selection factors.129 Do such
screening methods constitute legalized eugenics or intelligent
use of reproductive technologies?
Some guidance may come from the Court of Justice of the
European Union, which is considering the precise definition of
the term “human embryo.”130 Specifically, the court is set to determine “the earliest stage of the human body.”131 In connection
with the case, the court’s Advocate General (AG) issued a nonbinding opinion in which it argued that the term human embryo “must be interpreted as matter which has the capacity to
develop into a complete human being.”132 According to the AG,
this would include totipotent cells, blastocysts, “[u]nfertilised
ova in to which a cell nucleus from a mature cell has been
transplanted,” and “[u]nfertilised ova whose division has been
stimulated by parthenogenesis insofar as totipotent cells would
be obtained in that way.”133
In addition to fertilization and the primitive streak stage,
viability is a stage of fetal development that is often cited as a
defining line as to where human life begins.134 As the U.S. Su128. Id.
129. Id. (“[G]enetic testing of embryos in the womb is permitted for the detection of hereditary diseases such as Down’s syndrome or Huntington’s disease.”).
130. See Societa Italiana Brevetti, Patenting Stem Cells in Europe: AG
Opinion in Brustle v. Greenpeace, 25 BNA WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 8
(2011).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the history preceding the
abortion decision and how viability is often used to mark the beginning of life).
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preme Court has argued, the government’s interest in a new
life becomes “compelling” at the stage of viability.135 At the
time of the Roe v. Wade decision, viability was determined to
exist at approximately twenty-eight weeks.136 However, advancements in medicine have pushed the stage of viability to
an earlier point in gestation; Justice O’Connor acknowledged
this fact a decade after Roe, when she noted that “[a]s medical
science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back
toward conception.”137
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the point of viability.138 A number of factors, such as sex, birth weight, and material exposure to steroids, affect the point at which a particular
fetus becomes viable.139 In Japan, neonates born after twentytwo weeks (as determined by last menstrual period) are resuscitated,140 while the Netherlands sets the mark at twenty-five
weeks.141 In the United States and United Kingdom, some neonates are resuscitated below twenty-three weeks.142 At twentytwo weeks, the most reliable published data suggest a survival

135. Id. at 114. Although the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade claimed that it
“need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins” and that it “is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer[,]” it arguably did so by focusing on
viability as the stage of fetal development where the state’s interest becomes
“compelling.” Id. at 159.
136. Id. at 160.
137. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The point of viability can also be altered
based on a woman’s access to a modern medical center with facilities to care
for a premature infant. SINGER, supra note 1, at 102.
138. Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 12, at 237.
139. Jon E. Tyson et al., Intensive Care for Extreme Prematurity—Moving
Beyond Gestational Age, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1672 (2008).
140. Satoshi Kusuda et al., Morbidity and Mortality of Infants with Very
Low Birth Weight in Japan: Center Variation, 118 PEDIATRICS e1130, e1134
(2006).
141. S. Verloove-Vanhorick, Management of the Neonate at the Limits of
Viability: The Dutch Perspective, 113 BJOG SUPP. 3, 13–16 (2006) (noting that
a gestational age of twenty-five weeks warrants intensive neonatal care).
142. Amer. Health Ass’n & Amer. Acad. of Pediatrics, 2005 American Heart
Association (AHA) Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and
Emergency Cardiovascular Care (ECC) of Pediatric and Neonatal Patients:
Neonatal Resuscitation Guidelines, 117 PEDIATRICS e1029, e1035 (2006); N.S.
Wood et al., Neurologic and Developmental Disability after Extremely Preterm
Birth, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 378, 379 (2000) (discussing resuscitation for infants with a gestational age of twenty to twenty-five weeks in the United
Kingdom).
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rate of 1% to 20%.143 Are these fetuses truly viable, if 80% to
99% of them die? Furthermore, a majority of these infants who
survive “sustain significant and permanent cognitive and physical disabilities.”144
For these reasons, one may argue that, although a viable
fetus is theoretically able to survive outside the mother’s womb,
until it actually does so, it is not functioning as an organism-asa-whole. Prior to that point, it is reasonable to assert that the
organism is properly deemed to be a fetus, embryo, blastocyst,
etc., and thus may be properly identified as life or a developmental stage of human life. In this respect, there is a strong
argument for identifying the beginning of human life with
birth, where there is biological and physiological independence,
and the life is functioning as an organism-as-a-whole independent of the mother’s body.
In other words, although a developing embryo or fetus has
the potential to become a human, and this potential increases
with each passing day, the actuality of being a distinct human
does not occur until birth. This is when the fetus moves beyond
the stage of being a potential human and actually becomes one.
This perspective of human life is consonant with Jewish principles, which hold that full title to life arises only at birth.145 Under Talmudic law, the fetus is considered to be part of the
mother’s body until the birthing process begins; at which point,
the fetus is considered a distinct life.146
This position is consistent with criminal law statutes
throughout the United States, which define a person as one
who is “born alive.”147 While the “born alive” rule is the norm
for state homicide statutes, “it has been effectively discarded
through the adoption of special feticide statutes now in effect in
143. Wood et al., supra note 142, at 379 tbl. 1.
144. Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 12, at 237.
145. See Aaron L. Mackler, Jewish Perspectives on Abortion, in DEFINING
THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 281, 284 (“No Jewish authority views the status of the fetus as fully equal to that of the mother, even
at the end of gestation.”).
146. Id. As Regis notes, a “fetus ha[s] the potential of becoming an independent entity with the prospect of a full life in front of it . . . .” REGIS, supra
note 5, at 163 (emphasis added).
147. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 13–26. The “born alive rule” does not recognize a “fetus as a distinct person under homicide law until the fetus [survives]
the birthing process” and is biologically independent from the mother. Id. at
14.
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most states.”148 Nevertheless, a larger question remains—
namely, can the existence of the entity, inside or outside a
woman’s body, “be so significant that it marks the beginning of
a new human life?”149 For example, continuity may also be
traced to a point during gestation where the human that is
born may be classified as an individual entity—something that
arguably occurs at the primitive streak stage—despite the fact
that there is a biological and physiological dependence on the
mother until birth.
Quickening has also been proposed as a defining moment
for personhood.150 The theory traces its roots to Thomas Aquinas, a Christian philosopher sometimes described as a “liberal”
Catholic.151 Aquinas argued that a fetus was unformed until
quickening, which is the time when a pregnant woman first
feels the fetus moving inside of her.152 He believed that this occurred forty days after conception for males, and eighty days
for females.153 For Aquinas, to have an abortion before quickening was birth control, not homicide.154 Quickening was also the
point of gestation, under English common law, when abortion
was a crime.155
148. Id. at 29.
149. SINGER, supra note 1, at 101.
150. Id. at 87 (noting that during the middle ages Christian philosophers
believed the soul to enter the fetus at quickening).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. It was not until the nineteenth century that the Roman Catholic
Church began to widely adopt the view that abortion, from the time of conception, is a form of homicide. Id.
155. Id. at 88. Singer provides an informative historical overview of abortion rights:
Under English law, once a baby moved and, arguably, showed itself to
be alive, abortion became illegal. Id. This changed in the nineteenth century
when legislation in England and the United States made abortion a crime at
any point after conception. Id. Physicians in the United States supported this
move because they knew the irrelevance of the quickening stage in terms of
fetus development. Id. This change in legislation was supported by the American Medical Association (AMA), which commenced a crusade against abortion.
Id. During the AMA’s national convention in 1859, “delegates voted unanimously to protest the ‘unwarrantable destruction of human life’” and thereafter began to lobby state legislatures for stricter laws against abortion Id. at 89.
There was little opposition to the AMA’s position, and their efforts were successful. Id.
Laws prohibiting abortions at any stage were present in every state by the
turn of the twentieth century. Id. Although the laws did not eliminate abortions, “[b]y 1950 American public opinion considered abortion ‘socially odious,’”
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Arriving at a determination of the point at which human
life begins does not answer the question of what rights ought to
attach to human life and its developmental stages. For example, classifying birth as the commencement of human life does
not imply that a zygote, embryo, or fetus should have rights
subservient to the mother or another human being. Such rights
could be linked to the relevant developmental category of life,
regardless of whether the rights are categorized as human
rights.
B. CESSATION OF THE ORGANISM-AS-A-WHOLE
The continuing existence of a person depends on the continued functioning of the organism-as-a-whole.156 Though many
and few called for re-legalization. Id. As Singer notes: “The changes in attitude
to early abortions that occurred in the nineteenth century reflected a change
in beliefs about when the life of the developing human being began, rather
than about the fundamental view that, once alive, the innocent human being
must not be killed.” Id. at 89–90. In the 1960s, the drug thalidomide helped
change the societal and legal view of abortion. Id. at 90. In many European
countries, women were prescribed thalidomide as a sedative during pregnancy. Id. Children began to be born with strange abnormalities, such as flaps of
skin for arms. Id. Once the link between the drug and the abnormalities was
made, women who were pregnant and had taken thalidomide sought abortions. Id. at 90–91. The push to legalize abortions was strengthened by a Belgian woman’s trial and acquittal after killing her infant, which was born with
serious birth defects linked to the drug. Id. at 91. Meanwhile, in the United
States, a woman named Sherri Finkbane, fearing that her unborn child would
have a severe defect after using thalidomide during her pregnancy, unsuccessfully sought to have an abortion in Arizona, California, and New Jersey. Id.
Finkbane was finally able to obtain an abortion in Sweden, which revealed the
fetus to be deformed. Id. At the time, this event shed a new light on abortion,
which began to be seen as not merely a choice between life and not life, but
rather a matter of degree—”what kind of life under what kind of conditions.”
Id.
In addition to the thalidomide catastrophe, statistics on the number of
women who died or were injured during illegal abortions galvanized public
sympathy for the re-legalization of abortion. Id. “In 1967[,] the British parliament passed a law allowing abortion . . . performed by a medical practitioner
to prevent ‘risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the woman or of
any of her existing children of the family greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated’” or “if there was a substantial risk that the [unborn] child would
be seriously handicapped” (this clause being influenced by the thalidomine
tragedy). Id. at 91–92. By the time Roe v. Wade was decided in the United
States, eighteen states had laws allowing abortions in a variety of circumstances, usually related to the woman’s health, a high risk of abnormality, or if
the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. Id. at 92.
156. See Lynne Rudder Baker, When Does a Person Begin?, in DEFINING
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consider the brain to be the most critical system, the body is
highly dependent on multiple systems.157 “The heart pumps
blood . . . , the lungs provide intake of oxygen and output of
carbon dioxide . . . , the intestines provide nutrition and hydration . . . , and the liver and kidneys detoxify ingested material
and excrete . . . waste[.]”158 Although the loss of one vital function may inevitably bring about death, it does not by itself constitute death, though interruption of any vital system for a period of time can result in the destruction of the organism-as-awhole.159
Historically, death has been defined as irreversible loss of
circulation, respiration, or brain function.160 The creation of the
ventilator drastically changed the notion of the meaning of
death.161 For those patients who needed only temporary support, this was a breakthrough technology.162 For others, who
were in irreversible comas or irreversibly unconscious states,
the ventilator served to prolong “life” indefinitely.163 Not only
did this provide grief to the families of the patients, hospital
administrators feared a scenario where wards would be full of
patients in such states.164
As Peter Singer explains, the proliferation of organ transTHE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 384, 397. As Singer
notes, “if human life is of equal worth, whether it has the capacity for consciousness or not, why focus on the death of the brain, rather than on the
death of the body as a whole?” SINGER, supra note 1, at 191.
157. Bernat, supra note 105, at 422.
158. Id.
159. Id.; Michael B. Green & Daniel Wikler, Brain Death and Personal
Identity, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at
507, 510. Vital signs can temporarily disappear, only to be restored later.
REGIS, supra note, at 160. For example, there have been false declarations of
death and premature burials. Id.
160. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 86–87.
161. The ventilator was developed by a Danish doctor during a worldwide
polio epidemic in the 1950s. SINGER, supra note 1, at 22. Children who had
contracted polio were dying because they were unable to breath. Id. at 22–23.
The doctor created a means of using air bags to pump oxygen into the lungs of
the children. Id. at 23. This practice was able to prolong life, until one stopped
pumping. Id. For a period of time, nurses and medical students pumped bags
into the lungs of patients, which was successful in saving the lives of some patients. Id. Thereafter, a mechanical pump was attached to the air bag. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. It is clear that use of technologies to support the body’s vital
functions may prolong life, but the removal of, or refusal to use, such support
is best defined as acknowledgement of the natural functioning of the organism-as-a-whole, rather than the hastening of death.
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plantation as a means of saving patients, and generating income, served as the catalyst for a new definition of human
death.165 Soon after the first successful heart transplant, a procedure that was performed in South Africa, Harvard University
established the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,166 which later
came to be known as the Harvard Brain Death Committee.167
The committee’s first report indicated that the current definition of death created a “‛controversy’ about obtaining organs for
transplantation.”168 The authors argued that death “is an arbitrary decision” and that their proposal—which defined death as
an irreversible coma—had “life-saving potential.”169 In defining
irreversible coma, however, the committee provided conflicting
definitions including “permanent loss of intellect,” “irreversible
coma as a result of permanent brain damage,” and “comatose
individuals who have no discernible central nervous activity.”170
Although brain death is generally seen as providing a more
reliable criteria for death than cardiopulmonary criteria, there
is significant disagreement as to what qualifies as a diagnosis
of brain death.171 Many patients diagnosed as brain dead have

165. Id.
166. The committee included ten physicians, a lawyer, a historian, and a
theologian. Id. at 24.
167. Prior to Dr. Barnard’s successful heart transplant, Henry Beecher,
who was chairman of a Harvard University committee that oversaw ethical
issues arising from experiments on human subjects, wrote a letter to Robert
Ebert, Dean of the Harvard Medical School, wherein he wrote that “Dr. Murray and I . . . think that the time has come for a further consideration of the
definition of death. Every major hospital has patients stacked up waiting for
suitable donors.” Id. Notably, Ebert did not set up the ad hoc committee until
after the successful heart transplant. Id.
168. Id. at 25. The first draft of the report was even more straightforward,
and Dean Ebert suggested that the committee reword its report, which it did.
Id. at 25–26.
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id. at 26–27. A report published in Neurosurgery in 1986 challenged
some of the assumptions underlying the brain death definition. At the time,
Japan did not recognize brain death as death of a human. Japanese scientists
found that in patients whose brain had “died” lacked an antidiuretic hormone.
After using an intravenous drip of the hormone to brain dead patients, the
doctors found that patients lived, on average, an additional 23 days after
death. Id. at 54.
171. Similar to the remarkable experience of Dr. Selzer, see supra note 10,
is that of Mr. Cybulski:
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the ability to breathe spontaneously and maintain a variety of
reflexes in the esophagus and other areas.172 In fact, it is generally accepted that the organism-as-a-whole can die though
the entire body is not yet dead.173 This idea is essential to the
notion and ability to transplant live organs from dead patients—it is an explicit recognition that something in a patient
remains alive despite the “death” of the patient. “Most startling
is the way in which such bodies commonly react to incision during organ harvesting. The heartbeat quickens and the blood
pressure rises rapidly. The reactions are often so extreme . . .
that some hospitals” utilize general anesthesia during organ
harvesting.174
Some argue that these bodily reactions do not demonstrate
that a person is alive.175 Others acknowledge that sections of
the brain can remain active, but claim that these pockets of activity have no meaningful significance because “the brain-as-awhole no longer exists as a functioning organ.”176 Doctors in

[D]octors in an Ottawa hospital had declared 79-year-old Mr.
Cybulski to be brain dead, ten weeks after an emergency operation on
his heart. The patient was about to be taken off life support and receive the last rites from a priest when, in response to his two-year-old
grandson yelling at him from the door of his room, Mr. Cybulski, it
was reported, sat up and stretched out his arms to the child. The patient was described as not only alive but exceedingly well one month
after this incident. Apparently the doctors involved cannot account for
this case; they confirm that the patient’s brain scans showed “almost”
no activity, and their assumption was that he had suffered irreparable brain damage.
Lock, supra note 10, at 576.
172. There are documented reports of brain dead patients being kept alive
for over three months. REGIS, supra note, at 164. In some instances, brain
dead pregnant women have been kept alive for months in order to successfully
deliver a baby. Id. Meanwhile, the patient lies in a hospital bed and, just like a
“live” patient, produces urine, is capable of bowel elimination, and is surrounded by the entire range of instrumentality that would accompany a patient in an intensive care unit. Id.
173. C. Pallis, Return to Elsinore, 16 J. MED. ETHICS 10, 11 (1990).
174. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 104–05 (indicating that the use of fentanyl
and Regitine aims to reduce potential pain and anxiety of the donor, and that
the drugs may also hasten death); David A. Jones, An Unfounded Diagnosis:
Revisiting the Medical and Metaphysical Justifications of “Brain Death,” in
DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 446, 450. The
wound bleeds just as if the patient were under another type of operation. Furthermore, during organ harvesting, the donor maintains a heartbeat, metabolic function, a breathing rate, a pulse, blood pressure, and temperature within
the normal limits. REGIS, supra note, at 164.
175. Jones, supra note 174, at 450.
176. Id. at 450–51.
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some countries are legally permitted to pronounce a patient as
brain dead without observing the electrical activity of the
brain, while others may rely on vague cognitive diagnoses for
brain death.177
For instance, for one to be diagnosed as being in a persistent or permanent vegetative state, there must be some irreversible loss of consciousness or other cognitive functions. Since
a determination that this loss is irreversible is not absolute, but
rather based on probabilities, there is intense debate regarding
who qualifies for such classifications, and disagreement as to
whether the specified cognitive functioning is lost temporarily
or irreversibly.178 One recent study found that patients who
were diagnosed as being in an irreversible “vegetative” state
showed signs of full consciousness when tested with an electroencephalogram (EEG).179 These findings underscore the fact
that ambiguous demarcations are problematic when one is
faced with a clinical decision in an individual case.180
177. Id. at 449.
178. Lizza, supra note 100, at 15 n.2; Multi-Society Task Force on PVS,
Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state: Parts 1 and 2, 330 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1499, 1501–1502 (1994). For example, in 2003, Terry Wallis regained
consciousness spontaneously after nineteen years in an unconscious state.
REGIS, supra note, at 161. A subsequent brain scan found that his brain has
apparently grown a mass of new axons and nerve fibers. Id. In 2006, a British
woman who was in an unconscious state was found to have brain responses
only to certain words. Id. The widely-publicized cases of Karen Ann Quinlan,
Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Shiavo all involved individuals who did not suffer
whole brain death. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 118.
179. Damian Cruse et al., Bedside Detection of Awareness in the Vegetative
State: A Cohort Study, 378 LANCET 2088, 2091 (2011).
180. See, e.g., Green & Wikler, supra note 159, at 523. The tragic case of
Rudy and Samuel Linares provides an apt example. In August of 1988, Mr.
Linares ran furiously into a Chicago firehouse begging for medical assistance
for his 6-month old son, Samuel, who had swallowed a balloon. Samuel’s eyes
had dimmed and he became limp—by the time he arrived at the hospital, he
had severe brain damage and had fallen into an irreversible coma. Although
the physicians all agreed that the child could not recover from the coma, they
kept him on life support for months. Given legal ambiguities as to when life
support could be terminated, and who could make this determination, the hospital refused to remove the equipment. The Linares’s pleaded with the hospital; they were emotionally and economically unable to handle the prolonged
death of their child. Finally, in April 1989, after nine months of “living” with
an irreversible coma, Mr. Linares entered the hospital with a gun and removed the life support from his child. He then took his child into his arms and
rocked him for thirty minutes as his child peacefully died in his arms. Once
Samuel has passed away, Mr. Linares gave the police his gun and handed
himself over. He was charged with first degree murder and brought before a
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Since “nearly all brain inputs and outputs pass through the
brain stem, and because the brain stem is the center for breathing, blood pressure control, and wakefulness,” some argue that
the permanent cessation of its functioning equates to death.181
However, the reliability of techniques that measure brain stem
activity has been called into question.182 Moreover, this definition fails to account for individuals with locked-in syndrome.
Locked-in syndrome is “a state of preserved conscious awareness, but with paralysis so profound that evidence of the preserved awareness may be difficult to ascertain.”183 For patients
with locked-in syndrome, although the brain stem and other
portions cease to function, portions of the brain responsible for
cognition and consciousness remain intact.184 This condition recently received considerable public attention due, in large part,
to the experience of Jean-Dominique Bauby, the former editorin-chief of Elle magazine, who suffered a massive stroke and
lapsed into a coma.185 Twenty days later, he awoke from his
coma, but suffered from locked-in syndrome.186 He retained the
ability to blink one eye and, through use of the eye and an assistant, wrote a memoir of his experience titled The Diving Bell
and the Butterfly, which later became an internationallyacclaimed film.187
In addition to humans with locked-in syndrome, thousands
of anencephalic infants are born each year.188 Anencephaly is a
severe and uniformly fatal abnormality resulting in the congenital absence of a skull, scalp and forebrain.189 At the time of

grand jury. Dirk Johnson, Questions of Law Live On After Father Helps Son
Die, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1989, at 26; see also SINGER, supra note 1, at 3. The
grand jury refused to indict him, and the prosecutors subsequently dropped
the case. During the pendency of the case, the prosecutor highlighted the “‘real
gap’ that has developed between advances in medical science and the law governing medical responsibility.” Robert Davis, Partee Says He Must Prosecute
Father In Death of Comatose Son, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1989, at 2.
181. Bernat, supra note 105, at 424.
182. Id. at 425.
183. Id. at 424.
184. John P. Lizza, On the Definition of Death, in DEFINING THE
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 533, 533–534.
185. PETER JOHN MCCULLAGH, CONSCIOUS IN A VEGETATIVE STATE?: A
CRITIQUE OF THE PVS CONCEPT 183 (1st ed. 2004).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Facts about Anencephaly, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdef
ects/Anencephaly.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
189. Id.
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birth, there is no functional cortex but only a hemorrhagic mass
of neurons and glia.190 Although half of these infants are stillborn and, of the other half, about ninety percent die within the
first week, survival beyond a few weeks has been reported in a
few instances.191 A comprehensive definition of life and death
must account for these states of existence.
Given the difficulty of doing so, some scholars have argued
that “the true standard of death” is “the irreversible cessation
of all brain functions.”192 This definition, however, has not been
widely adopted.193 Furthermore, medical journals document
over 150 cases of individuals who were declared “whole brain
dead” who remained “alive” for weeks, months, and, in one instance, over fifteen years.194 These patients “continued numerous bodily functions that are often associated with living organisms, including the metabolism of nutrition and excretion of
waste, regulation of temperature, maintaining electrolyte balance, functioning immune response, continued growth, and the
production of sperm and eggs.”195
More troubling is the process of decision-making; a majority of the top neurology departments in the United States do not
require that a neurologist must make a determination of brain

190. See Jean-Michael Guerit, The Concept of Brain Death, in BRAIN
DEATH AND DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 15, 19–20 (C. Machado and D. A.
Shewmon, eds., 2004); S. Shinnar & J. Arras, Ethical issues in the use of anencephalic infants as organ donors, 7 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 730, 730 (1989). In
some anencephalic infants, the top of the skull may be missing above the eyebrows, and in its place may be a layer of skin. SINGER, supra note 1, at 38. In
other cases the skull may be malformed or filled with fluid. Id. Other infants
suffer catastrophic brain damage shortly after birth, such that they can never
regain consciousness. Id. at 39. However, both types of infants may be kept
alive for months or years. Id. Both may have a functioning brain stem, and
thus the infant “may move their limbs, cough, sneeze, cry, and even appear to
smile . . . .” Id. at 39–40. Can we think of these infants as born dead?
191. Lizza, supra note 100, at 16 n.3. Peter Singer presents a challenging
perspective: The heart of an anencephalic infant is a heart of a member of the
species Homo sapiens, but the heart will not beat faster when the infant’s
mother walks into the room because the infant cannot feel emotions of love or
concern for anyone. The heart of a chimpanzee is not a heart of a member of
the species Homo sapiens, but it is capable of relating to others, showing love
and concern. In a sense, the heart of the chimpanzee is more human than the
infant’s. SINGER, supra note 1, at 205.
192. BERNAT, CULVER & GERT, supra note 107, at 8 (emphasis added).
193. See id.
194. See FOLEY, supra note 1, at 125.
195. See id.
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death, and the majority of states do not require a second opinion.196 Nevertheless, the medical community generally agrees
that ongoing biological activity in various cells or tissues is not
sufficient to mark the presence of a living organism.197 For example, in some patients with total brain failure, the body still
“fight[s] infection, heal[s] wounds, and maintain[s] temperature.”198 Whereas parts of the organism remain alive, the organism-as-a-whole arguably does not.
In the United States, the Uniform Definition of Death Act,
which has been substantially adopted in all fifty states, defines
death as either an “irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem” or an “irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”199 Although a
determination of either permits organ harvesting, there is no
consensus on how much time must elapse prior to a determination of death. The University of Pittsburgh maintains a twominute protocol before declaring cardiopulmonary death, while
the Denver Children’s Hospital requires a wait of seventy-five
seconds before organ harvesting from children can take
place.200 Australian regulations require a wait of at least two
minutes, but no more than five, while Canada recommends
that physicians wait at least five minutes.201 In the European
Union, a ten-minute wait is required prior to organ harvesting.202 Despite these protocols, resuscitation of cardiopulmonary function is possible for ten to fifteen minutes following the
cessation of cardiac output.203 However, there is no regulation
or institutional policy that mandates a fifteen-minute wait prior to organ harvesting.204
196. See id. at 129. Examples of improper determinations of brain death
have been made, though they rarely receive much attention in the popular
press. Id. at 127–129.
197. Those who support the whole brain death criteria note that the focus
must be on brain function, not brain activity. Id. at 120.
198. The President’s Council of Bioethics, Selections from Controversies in
the Determination of Death: A White Paper, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND
END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 551, 559.
199. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 120.
200. Id. at 90.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 91. One patient’s experience, from June 2008, is particularly notable:
A forty-five-year-old man had a heart attack and was rushed to the
nearby hospital, where resuscitation efforts took place for ninety
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Marking the point of death becomes particularly relevant
when one seeks to determine the point at which organ harvesting can begin. Although societies have established various laws
and practices surrounding dying and death, the event of death
is a biological phenomenon that can be studied and described.205 Accurately defining the moment of death is not only
significant for the individual and the people close to the dying
person, it has important implications for issues such as organ
harvesting, when providers can stop treatment, and when payers can stop paying for treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
While biomedical innovations have significantly enhanced
the human condition, they have also challenged conventional
notions of how we define human life.206 It may be the case that

minutes. He was declared dead using cardiopulmonary criteria, and
preparations were begun for organ retrieval. He “came alive” in the
operating room, and after a significant time in intensive care, fully
recovered.
Id. at 94 (citing John Lichfield, Dead Patient Comes Around as Organs are
About to be Removed, INDEPENDENT (London), June 12, 2008, at 30; Dead Man
Waking Shocks Doctors, TORONTO SUN, June 11, 2008, at 34).
205. See Bernat, supra note 105, at 414.
206. Peter Singer perceptively summarized the issues more than a decade
ago:
Like cosmology before Copernicus, the traditional doctrine of the
sanctity of human life is today in deep trouble. Its defenders have responded, naturally enough, by trying to patch up the holes that keep
appearing in it. They have redefined death so that they can remove
beating hearts from warm, breathing bodies, and give them to others
with better prospects, while telling themselves that they are only taking organs from a corpse. They have drawn a distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ means of treatment, which allows them to
persuade themselves that their decision to withdraw a respirator
from a person in an irreversible coma has nothing to do with the patient’s poor quality of life. They give terminally ill patients huge doses
of morphine that they know will shorten their lives, but say that this
is not euthanasia, because their declared intention is to relieve pain.
They select severely disabled infants for ‘non-treatment’ and make
sure they die, without thinking of themselves as killing them. By
denying that an individual human being comes into existence before
birth, the more flexible adherents of the sanctity of life doctrine are
able to put the life, health, and well-being of a woman ahead of that of
a fetus. Finally, by putting a taboo on comparisons between intellectually disabled human beings and nonhuman animals, they have preserved the species boundary as the boundary of the sanctity of life
ethic, despite overwhelming evidence that the differences between us
and other species are differences of degree rather than of kind.
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humans are the only organism that can contemplate their own
existence. Indeed, some have argued that the human capacity
for self-definition may be viewed as one of the crowning
achievements of our species.207
This faculty, however, comes with a price. The ability to
determine who we include as part of us has an important moral
dimension, and we must be mindful not to engage in ontological
gerrymandering.208 As history reveals, the capability has been
frequently utilized as a tool to suppress the rights of minorities
and indigenous peoples.209 Although such historical malfeasance has often been discussed, the social, cultural, and historical depth of defining personhood has been insufficiently explored. In order to intelligently frame public policy in light of
technological advancements,210 legislators must closely examThe patching could go on, but it is hard to see a long and beneficial future for an ethic as paradoxical, incoherent and dependent on
pretence as our conventional ethic of life and death has become. New
medical techniques, decisions in landmark legal cases and shifts of
public opinion are constantly threatening to bring the whole edifice
crashing down.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 188–89.
207. Taçon, supra note 35, at 66. Others posit that one of the few remaining features that is uniquely human is “the fact that we humans continue to
be enthralled with our own intelligence . . . .” Trenton W. Holliday, Comment
on Henshilwood and Marean: The Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 639, 640 (2003); see also Savulescu, supra note 7, at
216 (“As human beings, we believe that being human has special significance .
. . .”).
208. See Green & Wikler, supra note 159, at 515 (discussing the difficulty
of determining death and how that determination alters the behavior of others).
209. Lizza, supra note 100, at 12.
210. In addition to directly addressing the extent to which medical technologies may be utilized by individuals, defining who is encompassed by the term
human impacts regulatory requirements of businesses. Each federal agency
arrives at a value of human life and uses this value to determine a wide range
of regulations that include restrictions on air pollution, the extent of warning
labels on cigarettes, and stronger roofs on cars. See Binyamin Appelbaum, A
Life’s Value, It May Depend on Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A3. Federal guidelines permit a valuation between $1 million and $10 million per human life, though the Office of Management and Budget has indicated that figures under $5 million “would be difficult to justify . . . .” Id at A3. Under the
Obama administration, agencies set values significantly higher than those
under the Bush administration. Id. at A1. For example, the EPA now values
human life at $9.1 million, up from $6.8 million during the Bush administration. Id. Similarly, the FDA values life at $7.9 million, up from $5 million in
2008. Id. Since these determinations are ultimately made by political appointees, the amounts invariably reflect the political agenda of the presiding administration. Id.
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ine the question of how we define human life by methodically
evaluating proposed definitions in light of verifiable scientific
data.
The wisdom gained from the work of anthropologists, geneticists, embryologists, and medical researchers provides an
important starting point for an interdisciplinary discussion of
issues such as human origins, human nature, and human
uniqueness. Though policy-makers must balance competing interests that are seemingly irreconcilable, this does not imply
that we are incapable of making progress towards consensus.
Progress requires critical reflection of personal beliefs coupled
with a thorough understanding of the relevant disciplines, each
placed in historical context. Whereas some scholars argue that
we can handle relevant moral issues without settling the question of personhood, I think that today’s moral issues can be
more appropriately addressed if we first have undertaken a
comprehensive exploration of what it means to be human.211
While this Article has undoubtedly raised more questions
than it has answered, my goal has been to challenge the
framework of how legal definitions of human are analyzed. To
this end, the findings discussed herein highlight the value and
limitations of various disciplines. A review of the anthropological record reveals clues as to the origins and characteristics of
Homo sapiens, though the record does not provide us with a definitive statement as to who qualifies as human. Genetics
guides our awareness of the evolution of mankind and the differences between species, yet fails to delineate the significance
of genetic variation and demarcate precisely where one species
ends and another begins. Medicine provides us with a window
into fetal development and end of life issues, but fails to identify the normative status of where each life begins and ends.
While current scientific knowledge may not provide us with an
unambiguous legal definition of human life, critically analyzing
objective characteristics facilitates an informed dialogue.212
211. As Darwin observes:
It has often and confidently been asserted, that man’s origin can never be known; but ignorance more frequently begets confidence than
does knowledge; it is those who know little, and not those who know
much, who so positively assert that this or that problem will never be
solved by science.
CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO
SEX 2 (2d ed. 1882).
212. In the end, arriving at a legal definition of human may not be the best
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And thus we find ourselves in the unique position of not
only determining the genesis of our own species, but also the
parameters of inclusion into our select club. In order to facilitate a nuanced analysis of defining when human life begins, we
must be mindful to separate the question of personhood from
the moral and legal obligations owed to each individual. Elucidating a clear vision of what it means to be human permits resolution of important legal, ethical and regulatory issues, and
helps guide one’s vision of life and well-being.

way to regulate the use of biomedical advancements. As Arthur Caplan argues, “[w]hat we must do is take each proposed enhancement technology under consideration and decide whether what it can do is worth whatever price it
might exact.” Arthur L. Caplan, Good, Better, or Best?, in HUMAN
ENHANCEMENT, supra note, at 199, 208; see Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulescu,
Introduction, in HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, supra note, at 19 (“Whether we
should employ a particular enhancement depends on the reasons for and
against that particular enhancement.”); see also Clive Gamble, Comment on
Henshilwood and Marean: The Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 638, 639 (2003) (noting that, in the field of archaeology, “grand narratives are currently on hold, universal statements should be
treated with caution, and local rather than global is currently king”).

